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PEOPLE PREFER SYSTEM 2 NUDGES  
(KIND OF) 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many 
other nations, those involved in law and policy have been exploring 
initiatives that preserve freedom of choice, or “nudges,” informed by 
behavioral science and promoting important public policy goals, such 
as improved health and safety. But there is a large and insufficiently 
explored difference between System 1 nudges, which target or benefit 
from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which target or 
benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings and default 
rules are System 1 nudges; statistical information and factual 
disclosures are System 2 nudges. On philosophical grounds, it might 
seem tempting to prefer System 2 nudges, on the assumption that they 
show greater respect for individual dignity and promote individual 
agency. A nationally representative survey in the United States finds 
evidence that, in important contexts, most people do prefer System 2 
nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed and firm. If people 
are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more 
effective, then many of them will shift to preferring the System 1 nudge. 
In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats, and independents 
show surprisingly similar responses. The survey findings and an 
accompanying normative analysis offer lessons for those involved in 
law and policy who are choosing between System 1 nudges and System 
2 nudges.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In numerous nations, those involved in law and policy have been 
exploring policy initiatives that preserve freedom of choice, or 
“nudges,” informed by behavioral economics and psychology and 
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meant to promote important goals, such as improved health and 
safety.1 But there is a large and insufficiently explored difference 
between System 1 nudges, which are not educative and which target or 
benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which are 
educative and target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic 
warnings and default rules count as System 1 nudges; statistical 
information and factual disclosures count as System 2 nudges. 
On philosophical grounds, it is tempting to prefer System 2 
nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual 
autonomy and dignity and promote individual agency. But it is also 
possible to prefer System 1 nudges, on the ground that they are likely 
to be cheaper and more effective, and also because they promote 
autonomy in their own way, by allowing people to conserve scarce 
cognitive resources and to devote attention to their largest concerns. 
For example, automatic enrollment in sensible savings plans might be 
preferable to financial education—or vice versa. Any judgment 
between System 1 and System 2 nudges would seem to require 
judgments about social welfare and individual autonomy, and the 
extent to which one or another nudge will promote them. 
A nationally representative survey in the United States finds 
evidence that, in important contexts in law and policy, a majority does 
prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed 
and firm. If people are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is 
significantly more effective, then many of them will shift to preferring 
the System 1 nudge. In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats, 
and independents show surprisingly similar responses. 
The survey findings fit with an analysis of a basic principle, which 
suggests that on grounds of welfare and autonomy, the choice between 
the two kinds of nudges is not self-evident. A great deal depends on 
context. In some settings, a System 1 nudge will promote social welfare 
and will not compromise autonomy in any way, and in some settings, a 
System 2 nudge is better on welfare grounds and will best promote 
autonomy. The survey findings, and the analysis, offer concrete lessons 
for those involved in law and policy who are choosing between System 
1 nudges and System 2 nudges. 
 
 1. See generally DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT (2015) (recounting the efforts 
of the United Kingdom’s Behavioural Insights Team, nicknamed the “Nudge Unit”); RHYS 
JONES, JESSICA PYKETT & MARK WHITEHEAD, CHANGING BEHAVIOURS: ON THE RISE OF THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE (2013) (analyzing the emergence of this trend); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
SIMPLER (2013) (discussing this approach in the context of its application by the Obama 
Administration). 
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I.  SYSTEM 1 NUDGES AND SYSTEM 2 NUDGES 
Nudges are interventions that steer people in particular directions 
but also allow them to go their own way.2 A reminder is a nudge; so is 
a warning. A GPS device nudges; a default rule nudges. Disclosure of 
relevant information (for example, about the risks of smoking or the 
costs of borrowing) counts as a nudge. A recommendation is a nudge. 
“Save More Tomorrow” plans, which allow employees to sign up to 
give some portion of their future earnings to pension programs, are 
nudges.3 The same is true of “Give More Tomorrow” plans, which 
allow employees to decide to give some portion of their future earnings 
to charity.4 
In many domains of law and policy, nudges are easy to find, 
whether or not they go by that name.5 In an increasing number of 
nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom, 
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology are being used to 
reorient law and policy in numerous areas, including savings, organ 
donation, energy, the environment, smoking, poverty, crime, voting 
behavior, and health.6 
In terms of law and public policy, it is helpful to distinguish 
between educative and noneducative nudges. Educative nudges 
include disclosure requirements, reminders, and warnings, which are 
specifically designed to increase people’s own powers of agency—
 
 2. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) (defining and exploring choice-preserving 
approaches). 
 3. See RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
309–22 (2015). 
 4. See generally Anna Breman, Give More Tomorrow: Two Field Experiments on Altruism 
and Intertemporal Choice, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1349 (2011) (showing significant increases in giving 
when Give More Tomorrow programs are implemented). 
 5. The most important examples are default rules, on which the literature is voluminous. 
For a classic discussion, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (analyzing how 
decisionmakers should set default rules). On nudging that is harmful, see generally GEORGE A. 
AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION 
AND DECEPTION (2015) (exploring how markets reward certain kinds of manipulation); OREN 
BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT (2012) (exploring how markets reward companies that 
exploit behavioral biases). 
 6. See supra note 1. For an important executive order on the uses of behavioral science, see 
Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,365 
(Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-18/pdf/2015-23630.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BEK3-P9L8] (directing agencies to use behavioral science in engaging with the 
American people). 
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perhaps by augmenting their knowledge and their capacities, perhaps 
by making relevant facts salient. Educative nudges can promote 
welfare by enabling people to make choices that increase their well-
being. In addition, educative nudges can easily fit within those aspects 
of the liberal political tradition that emphasize agency and autonomy.7 
By adding to people’s stock of knowledge, they can help them to be 
better choosers. 
Noneducative nudges include default rules and strategic decisions 
about how items are ordered (as on a menu or at a cafeteria); these are 
designed to preserve freedom of choice without necessarily increasing 
individual agency. Noneducative nudges may well increase welfare in 
the same way that GPS devices do (because they make it so much 
easier to navigate); such nudges might also be welcome because they 
impose few demands, in terms of time or attention, on those whom they 
are aimed to benefit. In that respect, noneducative nudges might 
promote autonomy in addition to welfare. 
Within behavioral science, some people have found it helpful to 
distinguish between two families of cognitive operations in the human 
mind: System 1, which is fast, automatic, and intuitive, and System 2, 
which is slow, calculative, and deliberative.8 When people recognize a 
smiling face, add three plus three, or know how to get to their 
bathroom in the middle of the night, System 1 is at work. When people 
first learn to drive, when they multiply 563 times 322, or when they 
choose a medical plan among several hard-to-distinguish alternatives, 
they must rely on System 2. 
System 1 can and often does get things right.9 As Daniel 
Kahneman and Shane Frederick write, “Although System 1 is more 
 
 7. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (describing a liberal 
conception of freedom and autonomy). 
 8. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (describing and 
analyzing this distinction and its impact). The idea of two systems is controversial, and it is 
reasonable to ask what, exactly, the idea is meant to capture. For example, something very 
different from a two-systems account is offered in Elizabeth A. Phelps, Karolina M. Lempert & 
Peter Sokol-Hessner, Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple Modulatory Neural Circuits, 37 
ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 263, 281–82 (2014) (suggesting that multiple, not dual, systems 
underlie decisionmaking). Following Kahneman, I understand the idea as a useful fiction, not 
referring to “systems in the standard sense of entities with interacting aspects or parts.” 
KAHNEMAN, supra, at 29. For those who reject the terminology, or are skeptical of it, it might be 
helpful simply to distinguish between noneducative and educative nudges, and to see the surveys 
here as asking when people prefer one or the other. 
 9. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A 
Failure to Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515 (2009) (showing that those with apparently 
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primitive than System 2, it is not necessarily less capable.”10 Through 
fast and frugal heuristics, people can perform exceedingly well.11 Any 
professional athlete or musician has an educated System 1; Serena 
Williams knows what shot to hit in an instant, and Taylor Swift has no 
difficulty remembering how to play her songs. As a result of years of 
practice, an experienced lawyer, judge, doctor, or engineer has a well-
trained System 1, and trained intuitions are often on the mark.12 At the 
same time, System 2 is hardly unerring. On multiplication problems, or 
in choosing among health-care plans, people often make mistakes, 
even if they are trying very hard.13 
Nonetheless, System 1 is distinctly associated with identifiable 
behavioral biases,14 producing a wide range of problems for policy and 
law.15 People sometimes show “present bias,” focusing on the short-
term and downplaying the future.16 Most people tend to be 
unrealistically optimistic.17 People use heuristics—or mental 
shortcuts—that usually work well, but that sometimes lead them in 
 
different perspectives on intuitions, or System 1, agree that educated and trained people often 
make excellent, rapid decisions). 
 10. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
 11. See generally GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GRP., SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999) (discussing the use of intuitive heuristics to make 
quick but effective decisions); GERD GIGERENZER, SIMPLY RATIONAL (2015) (same). 
 12. See generally GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 
(1998) (exploring how individuals with on-the-job experience make intuitive decisions in difficult 
circumstances). 
 13. See generally Eric J. Johnson, Ran Hassin, Tom Baker, Allison T. Bajger & Galen 
Treuer, Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture, 
PLOS ONE (Dec. 18, 2013), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.
pone.0081521.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPX4-2QS8] (concluding that individuals using online 
exchanges are not very good at choosing the most cost-effective health insurance plan). 
 14. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 7; Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 10, at 53–54. For 
catalogues of relevant findings, see generally BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF PREFERENCES, 
CHOICES, AND HAPPINESS (Shinsuke Ikeda et al. eds., 2015) (cataloguing a wide range of biases); 
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT 
AND MEMORY (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2004) (same). 
 15. For a range of demonstrations, see generally THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
 16. For references and discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral 
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1842–52 (2013) (discussing present bias and 
related biases). 
 17. See generally TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY 
POSITIVE BRAIN (2011) (exploring the human tendency to be unrealistically optimistic). 
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unfortunate directions.18 With respect to probability, people’s 
intuitions may go badly wrong, in the sense that they produce serious 
mistakes, including life-altering ones.19 To be sure, our intuitions are 
both adequate and helpful in the situations in which we ordinarily find 
ourselves.20 But there is no question that intuitions can badly misfire,21 
and that good nudges, and good choice architecture, will often provide 
indispensable assistance, by helping people move in directions that 
they themselves prefer.22 The regulatory and legal systems often 
respond.23 
Educative nudges, offered by government agencies, should be 
seen as attempts to strengthen the hand of System 2 by improving the 
 
 18. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 7. 
 19. For a powerful demonstration, see Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz & Kelly Shue, 
Decision-Making Under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, 
and Baseball Umpires 12–26 (Jan. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538147 [https://perma.cc/W8H2-STE2] (showing that 
decisionmakers often try to make sure that in small samples, the percentage of favorable and 
unfavorable outcomes tracks what would be observed in large samples). 
 20. This position is vigorously defended in GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 11, at 6. For a 
broader discussion, see generally MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011) (exploring 
apparently competing positions about whether heuristics produce systematic biases or are instead 
essentially accurate). In my view, the outcome of this occasionally heated debate within 
psychology does not have strong implications for law and policy. Everyone agrees that heuristics 
generally work well; that is why they exist. On that count, there is no opposition between the 
supposedly competing sides. Everyone agrees that heuristics are generally fast and frugal. 
Everyone also agrees that in important cases, boundedly rational people make mistakes. 
Everyone should also agree that in important cases, excellent (in the sense of useful and generally 
accurate) heuristics produce errors. When they make mistakes, some kind of nudge, or an 
improvement in choice architecture, might help. To be sure, the best nudge may or may not 
involve education or some kind of “boost.” See generally Ralph Hertwig & M.D. Ryall, Nudge vs. 
Boost: Agency Dynamics Under “Libertarian Paternalism” (Jan. 1, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711166 [https://perma.cc/
W8H2-STE2] (defining boosts and exploring some of their potential advantages). 
 21. In the context of household finance, see generally John Y. Campbell, Restoring Rational 
Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation, 106 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 1 (2016) (cataloguing household errors and calling for various forms of intervention, 
including mandates, to correct them). 
 22. For a powerful demonstration, see Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Søren Leth-Petersen, 
Torben Nielsen & Tore Olsen, Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement Savings 
Accounts: Evidence from Denmark 40–43 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
18565, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18565 [https://perma.cc/9TDQ-Y63Z] (finding large 
effects from automatic enrollment in savings plans). For overviews, see generally HALPERN, supra 
note 6 (outlining initiatives of the Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom); Raj 
Chetty, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 
1 (2015) (suggesting an assortment of policies informed by behavioral economics).  
 23. For recent illustrations, see generally HALPERN, supra note 1; JONES ET AL., supra note 
1. 
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role of deliberation and people’s considered judgments.24 The most 
obvious example is disclosure of relevant information.25 Some kinds of 
nudges, sometimes described as “boosts,” attempt to improve people’s 
capacity to make choices for themselves, for example by improving 
statistical literacy.26 
Noneducative nudges are designed to appeal to, or to enlist, 
System 1.27 Graphic health warnings can be seen as an example, at least 
if they are not understood as having the purpose or effect of 
education.28 We might distinguish between System 2 disclosures, 
designed simply to give people factual information and ask them to 
process it, and System 1 disclosures, designed to work on the automatic 
system (for example, by inculcating fear or hope).29 Some nudges do 
not appeal to System 1, strictly speaking, but turn out to work because 
of their operation—as, for example, where default rules have large 
effects in part because of the power of inertia,30 or where the ordering 
 
 24. For many examples, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 (exploring educative nudges 
used by the U.S. government, including labels of various kinds); Till Grüne-Yanoff & Ralph 
Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and Theory?, 26 MINDS & MACHINES 
149 (2016) (discussing the idea of “boosts” and exploring some of the reasons that they might be 
preferred). 
 25. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 
contains several examples. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). They 
are outlined, and their effects are discussed, in Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale 
Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit 
Cards (Aug. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2330942 [https://perma.cc/6CTP-AYTP] (finding that the CARD Act has saved consumers 
over $12 billion annually). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 6 (offering a variety of 
illustrations). 
 26. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (exploring the value of 
interventions that boost people’s capacities). 
 27. RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES 6 (2012). Rebonato actually defines 
libertarian paternalism in a way that fits with what I am calling System 1 nudges, seeing it as “the 
set of interventions aimed at overcoming the unavoidable cognitive biases and decisional 
inadequacies of an individual by exploiting them.” Id. In the same vein, see Grüne-Yanoff & 
Hertwig, supra note 24, at 149–51. 
 28. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 696 F.3d 
1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). For an excellent discussion, see generally Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, 
Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 53 (2013) (finding that graphic warnings can actually make people better 
informed). 
 29. See Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1022–25 (2015) (noting differences between System 1 disclosures and System 
2 disclosures and suggesting that the former might be more effective). 
 30. See Johnson et al., supra note 13, at 5 (exploring the power of default rules and the role 
of inertia). 
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of items on a menu affects what people choose, because of the selective 
nature of attention.31 Nudges of this kind can be seen as “exploiting” 
the operations of System 1,32 though it would be more neutral to say 
that they take account of those operations, acknowledging that some 
form of choice architecture, likely affecting System 1, is inevitable.33 
As I understand them here, System 2 nudges are specifically 
designed to increase people’s capacity to exercise their own agency. On 
ethical and other grounds, they might seem better for that reason.34 As 
Jeremy Waldron writes, “I wish, though, that I could be made a better 
chooser rather than having someone on high take advantage (even for 
my own benefit) of my current thoughtlessness and my shabby 
intuitions.”35 
In the abstract, Waldron’s wish is an honorable one,36 and some 
nudges are specifically designed to fulfill it. But as a matter of principle, 
the challenge arises when it is costly and difficult to make people better 
 
 31. See Eran Dayan & Maya Bar-Hillel, Nudge to Nobesity II: Menu Positions Influence 
Food Orders, 6 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 333, 333 (2011) (demonstrating effects of 
position on a menu); Daniel R. Feenberg, Ina Ganguli, Patrick Gaule & Jonathan Gruber, It’s 
Good To Be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21141, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21141 
[https://perma.cc/K2XU-WY5K] (showing that people are more likely to read and cite academic 
papers that come first in a list). 
 32. See REBONATO, supra note 27, at 6 (suggesting that nudges exploit behavioral biases). 
 33. For a sustained argument that because of market pressures, System 1 nudges from the 
private sector are endemic in a market economy, see generally AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 
5 (discussing how market pressures lead sellers to exploit ignorance and cognitive biases). 
It is true and important that all System 1 nudges are not the same, and that people might 
reasonably distinguish among them. It would be possible to be skeptical about graphic health 
warnings and to approve of automatic enrollment, and vice versa. One might think, for example, 
that graphic warnings do not treat people with sufficient respect and that automatic enrollment is 
a valuable time-saver, or instead think that graphic warnings are informative and unobjectionable, 
see Jolls, supra note 28, at 57–58, and that automatic enrollment exploits people’s tendency toward 
inertia. It is also true that System 2 nudges might have meaningful differences; a simplified 
disclosure could be better or worse than a more complicated one. 
I am bracketing these various complexities here. Further work might test whether 
particular kinds of System 1 nudges attract particular support or disapproval and exactly why. 
Some preliminary evidence on this count can generally be found in Janice Y. Jung & Barbara A. 
Mellers, American Attitudes Toward Nudges, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 62 (2016) 
(finding general support for nudges) and also in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE 
(2016) (same). 
 34. This idea is called into question by the illuminating discussion in Andrés Moles, Nudging 
for Liberals, 41 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 644 (2015). 
 35. Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/cass-sunstein-its-all-your-own-good 
[https://perma.cc/4MXL-ZYN2]. 
 36. REBONATO, supra note 27, is in a similar vein. 
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choosers—and when the net benefits of a System 1 nudge are far higher 
than the net benefits of a System 2 nudge.37 System 1 nudges, such as 
automatic enrollment, make life much simpler, and that is no small 
gain.38 There is also evidence that System 2 nudges can affect beliefs 
without affecting behavior, and that System 1 nudges can be more 
effective in altering what people actually do.39 The choice between 
System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges raises pervasive and 
fundamental questions about agency, freedom, and welfare. 
My primary goal in this Article is to report the results of a 
nationally representative survey designed to elicit people’s preferences 
as between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges in diverse contexts.40 
Administered by Survey Sampling International, the survey included 
more than 2,800 Americans, who were paid for their participation. As 
we shall see, I also conducted a series of clarifying surveys on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk,41 but my emphasis will be on the nationally 
representative survey. In brief, seven different groups, each consisting 
of more than four hundred people, were asked to register their 
 
 37. Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 430 (2011) 
(arguing that financial education does not work and that other approaches, such as automatic 
enrollment, are better). See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (identifying some 
limits and costs of nudges). 
 38. See generally SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY (2013) 
(emphasizing that poverty, hunger, loneliness, and time-management problems create what they 
call cognitive “scarcity,” creating a bandwidth problem that can impair decisions). 
 39. See Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim & Annamaria Lusardi, The Effect of 
Financial Education on the Quality of Decision Making 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20618, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20618 [https://perma.cc/H8YC-
DQF5] (exploring the mixed effects of financial education on decision making). 
 40. Three other studies with different designs have explored this question. See generally 
Gidon Felsen, Noah Castelo & Peter B. Reiner, Decisional Enhancement and Autonomy: Public 
Attitudes Toward Overt and Covert Nudges, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 202 (2013) 
(testing people’s attitude toward employment prospects, and finding generally high levels of 
approval of System 2 nudges); Jung & Mellers, supra note 33 (finding that, on bounded scales, 
people generally prefer System 2 nudges); Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein, The People’s 
Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies (July 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.tau.ac.il/~aradayal/LP.pdf [https://perma.cc/C95Y-MKLD] (finding evidence of 
“reactance” against System 1 nudges and some inclination to prefer System 2 nudges). The 
findings in this Article are broadly compatible with those in these earlier papers. At the same 
time, the present survey is (so far as I am aware) the first to ask people to make an extended series 
of direct choices between System 1 and System 2 nudges (though Arad and Rubinstein do ask 
several questions that provide some evidence on that issue). 
 41. The sample on Amazon Mechanical Turk is not nationally representative. For discussion, 
see Connor Huff & Dustin Tingley, “Who Are These People?” Evaluating the Demographic 
Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents, RES. & POL., July–Sept. 
2015, at 1. Note that in my surveys, the results on Amazon Mechanical Turk are quite close to the 
results in the nationally representative survey, where the same questions were asked. 
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preferences as between System 1 and System 2 nudges. Respondents 
were asked to choose between a System 1 nudge, which involved either 
a graphic warning or a default rule, and a System 2 nudge, which 
involved some form of education. 
The central question was whether people preferred educative or 
noneducative nudges in a pairwise comparison on each topic. Four of 
the pairs involved areas in which nudges have often been used as policy 
tools: savings, smoking, clean energy, and water conservation.42 In 
many ways, these pairs, which serve as the focus of Part II, can be seen 
as standard, illustrating as they do dilemmas that can be found in 
multiple domains. Three other pairs, which serve as the focus for Part 
III, involved areas that raise highly distinctive issues and concerns: 
voter registration, childhood obesity, and abortion.43 
With respect to the four standard issues, the first finding is that, in 
a neutral condition in which participants received no information about 
the effectiveness of System 1 or System 2 nudges, a majority of 
respondents preferred the System 2 nudge. Notably, however, a strong 
minority—between 26 percent and 45 percent—favored System 1 
nudges. In the neutral condition, two of the four issues produced no 
significant differences among Democrats, Republicans, and 
independents. And while two of the issues did produce such 
differences, with a higher percentage of Democrats favoring System 1 
nudges, the differences were relatively small. 
The second finding is that when people were asked to assume that 
System 1 nudges were “significantly more effective,” many of the 
respondents shifted their preference to such nudges—but the shift was 
relatively modest, usually in the vicinity of about 12 percentage points. 
The third finding is surprising: when people were presented with 
specific numbers offering a quantitative demonstration that System 1 
nudges were more effective, the shift in the direction of System 1 
nudges was essentially the same in magnitude. The fourth and final 
finding is also surprising: when people were asked to assume that 
 
 42. I borrow the water conservation example from Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 67. 
 43. Note that the various questions asked people abstractly about policies; they did not 
personalize those policies by suggesting that the policies would apply to “you.” There is some 
intriguing evidence that when people see an arguably paternalistic nudge as applying to them 
personally, they are less likely to support it. See generally James F.M. Cornwell & David H. 
Krantz, Public Policy for Thee, but Not for Me: Varying the Grammatical Person of Public Policy 
Justifications Influences Their Support, 9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 433 (2014) (showing 
lower levels of support for nudges directed at “you”). An important paper, however, does not 
find any such effect in general. See Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 70–71 (finding no such effect). 
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System 2 nudges were “significantly more effective,” there was no shift 
in the direction of those nudges. This is a mystery, and I will attempt to 
explain it. 
The most obvious interpretation of these findings is that in 
important contexts, most participants want to protect and promote 
people’s agency, so they will favor System 2 nudges44—but many also 
care about effectiveness, and so will turn to System 1 nudges if the 
evidence shows that they are significantly better. At the same time, 
there is significant heterogeneity within the American population. 
Many people prefer System 1 nudges, perhaps on the ground that they 
are more effective, perhaps on the ground that they make life simpler 
and easier. Some people appear not to have any abstract preference as 
between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges; they appear to care 
only about effectiveness.45 By contrast, some people have a strong 
preference for System 2 nudges, and will require compelling evidence 
of superior effectiveness to switch to favoring System 1 nudges. 
Because a significant number of Americans show no inclination to 
prefer System 1 nudges even when asked to assume that they are 
clearly more effective, we can safely say that some segment of the 
population would demand very powerful evidence to favor System 1 
nudges—and perhaps no evidence would be sufficient.46 I shall offer 
some concrete evidence to this effect.47 
With respect to the three distinctive issues—increasing voter 
registration, combatting childhood obesity, and discouraging 
abortions—the patterns are illuminatingly different. In the neutral 
condition, a majority of respondents did not favor System 2 nudges for 
the first two issues. On the contrary, automatic voter registration had 
clear majority support, and for childhood obesity, a majority deemed 
 
 44. There is a relationship here with the finding of a “control premium” described generally 
in Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass R. Sunstein & Tali Sharot, Are Choosers Losers? The 
Propensity to Under-Delegate in the Face of Potential Gains and Losses (Feb. 15, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733142 [https://
perma.cc/G4GB-NRPY] (finding that people will sacrifice money to maintain control, even when 
their own information suggests that it is in their interest to delegate). 
 45. See Arad & Rubinstein, supra note 40, at 18–19 (finding that many people fall into this 
category for certain nudges). 
 46. Note, however, that most Americans do support System 1 nudges, as for example in the 
context of graphic warnings for cigarettes and graphic campaigns to deter distracted driving and 
childhood obesity. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 132. The point here is that in a pairwise 
comparison, Americans tend to prefer System 2 nudges. 
 47. See infra Table 17. 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2016  3:18 PM 
2016] PEOPLE PREFER SYSTEM 2 NUDGES 133 
cafeteria design48 to be preferable to parental education. Asking 
people to assume the significantly greater effectiveness of the System 
1 nudge does increase the level of support, but it is high even without 
that information. The best explanations for the preference for System 
1 nudges involve people’s judgments about the protection of the 
franchise (arguing in favor of automatic registration) and the 
protection of children (favoring cafeteria design). 
With respect to reducing the number of abortions, a majority of 
respondents consistently favored System 2 nudges, and that preference 
did not shift when people were asked to assume that System 1 nudges 
were more effective—undoubtedly because of a belief, on the part of 
many, that it is not appropriate for public officials to appeal to System 
1 nudges to discourage women from making their own choices. 
Notably, Republicans, Democrats, and independents all favored 
System 2 nudges in the abortion setting, although in most conditions, 
the level of support for System 1 nudges was significantly lower among 
Democrats. The sharp distinction between majority approval of a 
System 1 nudge for increasing voter registration and majority approval 
of a System 2 nudge for discouraging abortions attests to the 
importance of people’s judgments about whether a right is at stake—
and whether a nudge is promoting or undermining it. 
The findings from the seven surveyed issues support a variety of 
conclusions. In important areas of regulatory policy, including 
environmental protection, savings, and health, a majority of Americans 
will prefer System 2 nudges to System 1 nudges, but there is likely to 
be significant division on that issue. If System 1 nudges are shown to 
be more effective, there will be an increase in preference for those 
nudges, but the increase will not be as dramatic as might be anticipated, 
apparently because some people put a high premium on personal 
agency. Insofar as children are involved, System 1 nudges will be more 
welcome, and the same is true if System 1 nudges facilitate people’s 
ability to enjoy something that qualifies as a right. If, on the other hand, 
any kind of nudge is compromising what people regard as a right, it will 
be rejected, and a System 2 nudge will be preferred because it shows 
greater respect for individual agency. 
In important respects, the survey findings are consistent with what 
emerges from a more sustained analysis of the normative issues; I 
sketch the central ingredients of that analysis here. Both the findings 
 
 48. For the best discussion, see generally BRIAN WANSINK, SLIM BY DESIGN (2014) 
(exploring the effects of choice architecture in producing obesity). 
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and the analysis bear on a variety of issues in law and policy. They 
suggest identifiable reasons to prefer System 2 nudges, such as 
disclosure of statistical information or some kind of education. But 
they also suggest that in many contexts, System 1 nudges such as 
default rules are preferable, certainly if the goal is to increase welfare.49 
One reason is that System 1 nudges may be more effective; a more 
important reason is that they might have higher net benefits, and thus 
be the best way to increase welfare.50 It might be tempting to think that 
System 1 nudges are objectionable because they reduce autonomy, but 
as we shall see, such nudges may actually increase autonomy. This is 
not least because they may make people rights-holders by default (as 
in the case of automatic voter registration), and also because they leave 
people with the time and bandwidth to focus on their most 
fundamental concerns. 
As we shall also see, System 1 might be inclined to favor System 2 
nudges: that is, people may well have an immediate, automatic sense 
that educative nudges are better. On this point, System 2 will 
frequently concur. But for many rights and interests, System 2 will 
ultimately decide that System 1 nudges are best on both welfare and 
autonomy grounds. 
II.  FOUR STANDARD ISSUES: SMOKING, SAVINGS, POLLUTION, AND 
WATER CONSERVATION 
My goal in this Part is to explore the principal survey itself. Let us 
begin with some additional remarks about methodology. 
The first four questions asked people to say whether they 
preferred a System 1 or System 2 nudge in the context of some familiar 
interventions in law and policy.51 I describe these issues as “standard” 
because they come up frequently in discussions of nudges and 
 
 49. Bubb, supra note 29, at 1026; Willis, supra note 37, at 432 (arguing that default rules are 
preferable to financial education). 
 50. I am bracketing the question of how best to define that contested concept. See generally 
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELFARE AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
(2012) (exploring the idea of social welfare in great detail.) 
 51. See generally Felix Ebeling & Sebastian Lotz, Domestic Uptake of Green Energy 
Promoted by Opt-Out Tariffs, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 868 (2015), http://www.nature.com/
nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2681.html [https://perma.cc/E7KP-XAB8] (finding 
large effects from automatic enrollment in green energy); Jolls, supra note 28 (suggesting that 
graphic warnings are helpful in informing people); Chetty et al., supra note 22 (finding large 
effects from automatic enrollment in savings plans). 
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behavioral economics, and because they do not raise distinctive issues 
about individual rights. Here are the four pairs: 
 
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of an antismoking campaign? 
1) Graphic warnings, with vivid pictures 
of people who are sick from cancer.  
2) Purely factual information, giving 
people statistical information about the 
risks from smoking.  
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a campaign to encourage people to 
save for retirement? 
1) Automatic enrollment of employees in 
savings plans, subject to “opt out” if 
employees do not want to participate.  
2) Financial literacy programs at the 
workplace, so that employees are 
educated about retirement options.  
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a program to reduce pollution? 
1) Automatic enrollment of customers in 
slightly more expensive “green” 
(environmentally friendly) energy, subject 
to “opt out” if customers want another, 
slightly less expensive energy source. 
2) Educational campaigns so that 
consumers can learn the advantages of 
green (environmentally friendly) energy.  
Which of these policies do you prefer, as a way of encouraging water conservation? 
1) The government requires hotels to 
select a default policy of “environment-
friendly rooms” in which towels left on 
the racks are not washed. If people want 
their towels washed, they can tell the 
front desk, and their towels will be 
washed daily.  
2) The government requires hotels to 
provide guests with information about an 
“environment-friendly” policy in which 
towels left on the racks are not washed. 
People are encouraged to choose to take 
part, but if they do not choose to do so, 
their towels will be washed every day.  
A. Respondents in the Neutral Condition (Condition 1) 
In a neutral condition, in which people were provided with no 
information about the effectiveness of System 1 or System 2 nudges, 
majorities consistently showed a clear preference for System 2 nudges. 
The aggregate data look like this: 
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Table 1: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When Given No Information About Their Effectiveness 
 
Issue 
Percentage of Respondents (n=430) Who: 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Smoking 45% 55% 
Savings 43% 57% 
Energy 26% 74% 
Water 32% 68% 
 
The preference for System 2 nudges is strongest in the cases of 
pollution reduction and water conservation. With respect to reducing 
pollution, the likely judgment is that it is better for people to learn and 
make their own choices than for them to be defaulted into an energy 
source that might turn out to be more expensive or less reliable. (I will 
turn to potential political divisions in Part II.E.) Participants might well 
have been concerned that people would not take the trouble to opt out 
and thus face higher electricity bills without their explicit consent.52 In 
the case of water conservation, money is not involved, but more people 
also favored System 2 nudges, perhaps because of a concern about 
defaulting guests into a situation that might not be in their interest 
(involving unwashed and perhaps dirty towels).53 
Although majority preference for System 2 nudges is consistent, 
large numbers of people do favor System 1 nudges in all four contexts. 
One reason might be that many participants believe System 1 nudges 
to be more effective, so long as no information is provided on that 
question. The 45 percent of respondents who preferred graphic 
warnings for cigarettes might well have believed that, if the goal is to 
address a serious public-health problem, such warnings are more likely 
to work than purely factual information. Another reason might be that 
some System 1 nudges seem to impose lower decisionmaking burdens 
on choosers, as in the cases of default rules for saving, energy, and 
water conservation. If a System 1 nudge makes things a great deal 
easier for people, and does not require them to act, it might appear to 
 
 52. Note, however, that most Americans do support automatic enrollment in green energy. 
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 121–22. 
 53. Compare here the analogous finding that while most Americans reject the automatic 
registration of people as organ donors, they favor the forced choice of whether to be organ donors 
when they receive their driver’s licenses. See id. 
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be preferable.54 System 2 nudges, by contrast, seem to require a larger 
apparatus (consider financial education), and a greater investment of 
time and attention from choosers. 
B. Respondents Informed that the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly 
More Effective” (Condition 2) 
In the neutral condition, people’s preferences could have any 
number of sources. To obtain some understanding of what motivated 
those preferences, a different group of people was asked to assume that 
the System 1 nudge was “significantly more effective” with respect to 
each of the four goals. The hypothesis was that these three words would 
lead to a major increase in the percentage of people who preferred 
System 1 nudges. 
The hypothesis was confirmed, but in a qualified way: 
Table 2: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly More Effective” 
 Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer System 1 Nudge 
Issue Neutral Condition (n = 430) 
Told that System 1 Nudge Is 
“Significantly More Effective” 
(n = 407) 
Smoking 45% 57% 
Savings 43% 55% 
Energy 26% 38% 
Water 32% 42% 
 
There are two noteworthy results here. First, the shift toward 
System 1 nudges is statistically significant for all four issues (using chi-
square analysis, two-tailed p < 0.05 for each question), but it is not 
massive.55 Second, the shift is essentially the same for all four questions. 
Indeed, it is remarkably consistent, with no significant differences 
across questions. When people are informed of the greater 
 
 54. See THALER, supra note 3, at 339–43 (discussing automatic enrollment and Save More 
Tomorrow plans); see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE (2015) 
(exploring why people might rationally choose not to choose). 
 55.  Statistical significance was defined as p < 0.05, using the Mann-Whitney U test to test 
whether the changes between different survey conditions were significant. That is, it tested the 
null hypothesis that there was no change between survey conditions against an alternative 
hypothesis that there was an increase or decrease from one survey condition to another. 
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effectiveness of System 1 nudges, support for System 1 nudges 
increases by ten to twelve percentage points. 
We do not have enough data to speak of anything like an iron law 
here, but it is not too speculative to say that many people tend to think 
that System 2 nudges will be more effective or will serve as a better way 
to respect people’s agency—but they will shift when they receive 
information about the comparative effectiveness of System 1 nudges. 
At the same time, many people (usually 40 percent or more) will have 
some degree of commitment, visceral or otherwise, to the superiority 
of the System 2 nudge.56 The addition of three words (“significantly 
more effective”) is not enough to change that commitment. 
C. Respondents Informed that the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly 
More Effective,” with Quantitative Information (Condition 3) 
The words “significantly more effective” have a high degree of 
opacity. It is not clear what they mean. Once they are specified in 
quantitative terms, they might have a stronger or weaker impact. 
Suppose, for example, that people are told to assume that automatic 
enrollment would increase participation in savings plans from 40 
percent to 90 percent, or that graphic warnings would save 200,000 lives 
annually—but that the System 2 alternatives would have essentially no 
impact. Under those assumptions, it would not be easy to reject the 
idea that System 1 nudges are better. To reject that idea, one would 
have to have concerns about the outcomes (saving lives is good, but the 
value of increased participation in savings plans is less obvious), or to 
put a very high premium indeed on a certain conception of personal 
agency.57 Alternatively, a System 1 nudge might be “significantly” 
more effective in a statistical sense, but its comparative advantage 
might be modest. If so, we might expect to see the same results as in 
the neutral condition—or even a movement in the direction of System 
2 nudges. 
To understand the effects of quantitative information, participants 
were asked to assume specified numerical disparities in favor of System 
 
 56. The survey did not directly measure the strength of people’s commitments; it asked for 
preferences and did not measure their intensity. 
 57. On the complexities here, see generally Luc Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, in 
PREFERENCE CHANGE 207 (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson eds., 2009) (exploring 
whether nudges are consistent with respect for autonomy); Moles, supra note 34 (defending much 
nudging as respectful of autonomy). 
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1 nudges—not so stark as in the examples just given, but nonetheless 
lopsided. 
 
• Antismoking Campaign: “Assume that [the System 1 nudge] is 
far more effective. It reduces smoking by 20 percent, while [the 
System 2 nudge] reduces smoking by 5 percent.”   
• Encouraging Retirement Savings: “Assume that [the System 1 
nudge] is far more effective. It leads 90 percent of workers to 
enroll in savings plans, whereas [the System 2 nudge] leads only 
55 percent to enroll in such plans.” 
• Reducing Pollution: “Assume that [the System 1 nudge] is far 
more effective. It cuts pollution by 40 percent, whereas [the 
System 2 nudge] cuts pollution by just 5 percent.” 
• Encouraging Water Conservation: “Assume that [the System 1 
nudge] is far more effective. On average it cuts water use from 
washing towels by 70 percent, whereas [the System 2 nudge] cuts 
water use from washing towels by 10 percent.” 
Here are the results: 
Table 3: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly More Effective,” with 
Quantitative Information 
 Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer System 1 Nudge 
Issue 
Neutral Condition 
(n = 430) 
Told that System 1 
Nudge Is 
“Significantly 
More Effective”  
(n = 407) 
Told that System 1 
Nudge Is More 
Effective, with 
Quantification  
(n = 435) 
Smoking 45% 57% 58% 
Savings 43% 55% 56% 
Energy 26% 38% 43% 
Water 32% 42% 47% 
 
It should be clear that the quantitative information did not have a 
larger effect than the words “significantly more effective.” Quite 
surprisingly, that information produced no statistically significant 
changes. One reason may be that the numerical differences were not 
particularly extreme; they plausibly reflected the kind of disparity that 
a purely qualitative account (“significantly more effective”) would 
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suggest. If so, the numbers provided no additional information. 
Another reason may be that the people who favored System 2 nudges, 
even in the face of a qualitative explanation that it would be less 
effective, did so because of a strong preference for what they saw as 
personal agency, and hence could not be moved even by fairly 
impressive numbers. It is natural to wonder whether a difference 
between the qualitative and the quantitative information would 
emerge in a between-subjects design, and I answer that question below. 
(To spoil the surprise: it does.58) 
D. Respondents Informed that the System 2 Nudge Is “Significantly 
More Effective” (Condition 4) 
If it is assumed that System 2 nudges are “significantly more 
effective,” we might expect that very large majorities would endorse 
them. If a nudge increases people’s own capacities and also produces 
the desired result, it would seem far preferable to a less effective 
intervention that does not educate people in any way. The principal 
qualification is that, if a nudge is effective in producing a result that 
people do not like, then they will of course reject it for that very reason. 
(Most people would not like a nudge that is effective in encouraging 
people to use illegal drugs or to text while driving.) I will turn to this 
point below. 
To test this hypothesis, I asked survey respondents whether they 
preferred System 1 or System 2 nudges on the assumption that the 
System 2 nudges were “significantly more effective.” Here are the 
results: 
Table 4: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the System 2 Nudge Is “Significantly More Effective” 




Neutral Condition (n = 430) 
Told that System 2 Nudge Is 
“Significantly More Effective” 
(n = 435) 
Smoking 45% 43% 
Savings 43% 44% 
Energy 26% 26% 
Water 32% 29% 
 
 
 58. See infra Table 15. 
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Most surprisingly, the assumption of the comparatively greater 
effectiveness of System 2 nudges does not produce any shift in their 
direction. The numbers are essentially identical—a highly unexpected 
finding. Any explanation remains speculative, but it is possible that 
those who supported System 2 nudges already assumed that they would 
be more effective, so the three additional words added no new 
information. Alternatively, some people might think that System 1 
nudges have some independent advantage (for example, because they 
operate automatically and cheaply), or that System 2 nudges have some 
independent disadvantage (for example, because they require a greater 
investment in time and attention). System 1 supporters might have 
stronger preferences than System 2 supporters and thus may be less 
likely to be persuaded by effectiveness arguments.59 For example, 
automatic enrollment in a savings plan might be more desirable than 
financial literacy programs, simply because it does not impose the costs 
and burdens of the latter. The same is true of automatic enrollment in 
green energy. It is also true that most people already prefer System 2 
nudges and hence fewer people are available to be moved. 
Some of these possibilities suggest that the lack of an effect from 
assuming that System 2 nudges are more effective is similar to the lack 
of effect of the quantitative information.60 Some people prefer System 
1 nudges even if they believe them to be less effective. They might be 
engaging in some kind of informal cost-benefit analysis (a point to 
which I will return). It is also reasonable to ask whether we would 
observe the same results in a within-subjects design—that is, where 
participants see and answer all of the questions within a survey—a 
question answered in Part IV. (More surprise spoiling: we do not 
observe the same results.61) 
E. Respondent Preferences by Partisan Affiliation 
Earlier work strongly suggests that in general, partisan divisions 
do not explain people’s judgments about nudges.62 What matters is the 
 
 59. I am grateful to Ralph Hertwig for help with the ideas in this paragraph. 
 60. See supra Part II.C. 
 61. See infra Table 15. 
 62. See Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 7), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2604084 {https://perma.cc/43AG-A8DP]; David 
Tannenbaum, Craig Fox & Todd Rogers, On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioral Policy 
Interventions 10 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://home.uchicago.edu/davetannenbaum/ 
documents/partisan%20nudge%20bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3AL-Z4SC] (finding that people 
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valence of the particular nudge.63 In other words, Republicans do not 
like nudges more or less than Democrats do; within limits, they tend to 
like nudges that steer people in directions of which they approve, and 
the same is true of Democrats.64 Do political affiliations explain 
people’s preferences for System 1 or System 2 nudges? Here are the 
results in full: 
Table 5: Preferences as Between System 1 and System 2 Nudges by 
Partisan Affiliation (Condition 1) 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Issue 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
Smoking 50% 44% 40% 50% 56% 60% 
Savings 42% 48% 39% 58% 52% 61% 
Energy 34% 24% 19% 66% 76% 81% 
Water 42% 27% 26% 58% 73% 74% 
Note: Respondents were: 163 Democrats, 142 Republicans, and 125 independents. 
Table 6: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the System 1 Nudge 
Is “Significantly More Effective” (Condition 2) 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Issue 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
Smoking 62% 57% 52% 38% 43% 48% 
Savings 60% 55% 49% 40% 45% 51% 
Energy 48% 31% 34% 52% 69% 66% 
Water 51% 36% 38% 49% 64% 62% 
Note: Respondents were: 163 Democrats, 142 Republicans, and 125 independents. 
  
 
do not, across political lines, like or dislike nudges in general; their judgments are based on their 
own political attitudes). 
 63. SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 151, 158 (exploring partisan similarities and differences); 
Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 72 (same); Sunstein, supra note 62, at 7 (same). 
 64. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 19–20. 
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Table 7: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the System 1 Nudge 
Is “Significantly More Effective,” with Quantitative Information 
(Condition 3) 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Issue 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
Smoking 61% 56% 56% 39% 44% 44% 
Savings 58% 51% 57% 42% 49% 43% 
Energy 47% 38% 42% 53% 62% 58% 
Water 52% 41% 48% 48% 59% 52% 
Note: Respondents were: 165 Democrats, 138 Republicans, and 132 independents. 
Table 8: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the System 2 Nudge 
Is “Significantly More Effective” (Condition 4) 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Issue 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
Smoking 53% 35% 39% 47% 65% 61% 
Savings 47% 37% 47% 53% 63% 53% 
Energy 28% 24% 25% 72% 76% 75% 
Water 41% 20% 23% 59% 80% 77% 
Note: Respondents were: 169 Democrats, 131 Republicans, and 133 independents. 
 
There are many numbers here, but the basic story is 
straightforward. A majority of Republicans, Democrats, and 
independents all favor System 2 nudges, with just one qualification: 
Democrats are evenly split with respect to antismoking nudges. Both 
qualitative and quantitative information about the greater 
effectiveness of System 1 nudges produces an increase of about 10 to 
20 percent in favor of System 1 nudges—and essentially the same 
degree of change is observed for all three groups. For all three groups, 
the assumption that System 2 nudges are significantly more effective 
produces results quite similar to those in the neutral condition. 
Notably, none of the differences between Condition 1 and Condition 
4, for any partisan affiliation, is statistically significant.65 
 
 65.  In these cases, I could not reject the null hypothesis that the differences between 
Condition 1 and Condition 4 were irrelevant for Democrats, Republicans, and independents. The 
differences for Republican respondents for smoking and saving might look statistically significant, 
but they are not. 
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The largest and most important finding here is that in many of the 
conditions, the differences among Democrats, Republicans, and 
independents are not significant. Their judgments as between System 
1 and System 2 nudges are broadly in line with one another. But in 
some conditions, Democrats are more inclined to System 1 nudges than 
are Republicans and independents. In all conditions, for example, 
Democrats are more favorably disposed than Republicans or 
independents to a System 1 nudge for water conservation; the 
difference is statistically significant (p < 0.05). In Condition 2, 
Democrats are more favorably disposed than Republicans or 
Independents to a System 1 nudge for energy. In Condition 4, 
Democrats are more favorably disposed than Republicans to a System 
1 nudge for smoking. 
We can offer some plausible explanations for these differences. 
Democrats are comparatively more enthusiastic about green energy 
and water conservation, and very possibly antismoking efforts as well; 
to them, a System 1 nudge might seem more appealing if it is thought 
to be more effective. Republicans might be more likely to favor a 
System 2 nudge, especially for green energy or water conservation, to 
preserve personal agency. Notably, however, there were no significant 
differences among the three groups in terms of movements across 
conditions. 
There is a quite fundamental point here. When people are 
enthusiastic about achieving the end result, they are probably more 
likely to support a System 1 nudge; when they are doubtful about the 
end, a System 2 nudge will seem preferable, above all because it is 
better in terms of retaining personal agency. We shall now find more 
evidence in this vein. 
III.  THREE DISTINCT ISSUES: VOTING, CHILDREN, AND ABORTION 
The range of System 1 and System 2 nudges is of course 
exceptionally wide. For example, some nudges promote rights by 
making them easier to enjoy; consider, for example, simplified voter 
registration. Some nudges involve children. Teachers impose mandates 
on elementary school children, but they also nudge them in various 
ways: to do their homework, to act courteously, and to avoid disrupting 
classes. Some nudges discourage the use of rights. We could easily 
imagine efforts to steer people away from certain religious practices, 
or to discourage them from exercising their right to sexual privacy; pro-
abstinence nudges are one example. 
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A. Testing Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
in the Context of the Three Distinctive Issues 
As illustrations of these distinctive kinds of nudges, I tested 
people’s judgments about voting, childhood obesity, and abortion. For 
the neutral Condition 1, the three pairs looked like this: 
 
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a program to increase voter registration? 
1) Automatic voter registration, so that 
when people receive their driver’s licenses, 
and show they are domiciled in your state, 
they are automatically registered as voters. 
2) A public education campaign to 
convince people to register to vote. 
 
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a program to combat childhood obesity? 
1) Redesigning school cafeterias so that 
healthy, low-calorie options are in the 
most visible locations. 
2) Educating parents about the problem 
of childhood obesity and how to combat 
it.  
Which of these policies do you prefer, as a means of discouraging abortions? (Please 
indicate which you prefer even if you do not like either.) 
1) Requiring pregnant women, before 
having an abortion, to see vivid photos of 
fetuses, designed to show that they are 
merely very young children. 
 
2) Requiring pregnant women, before 
having an abortion, to speak briefly with 
a doctor about whether they really 
believe, on reflection, that an abortion is 
the right choice, in light of the moral 
issues involved. 
 
Just as with the four standard questions from Part II, people 
participating in Condition 2 were asked about their preference under 
the assumption that the System 1 nudge was “significantly more 
effective.” In Condition 4, participants were asked about their 
preference under the assumption that the System 2 nudge was 
“significantly more effective.” In terms of Condition 3, where the 
assumption that the System 1 nudge was “significantly more effective” 
was also supported by quantitative information, the survey questions 
looked like this: 
 
• Increasing Voter Registration: “Which of these policies do you 
prefer, as part of a program to increase voter registration? 
Assume that 1) is significantly more effective in increasing 
voter registration. It registers 40 percent of currently 
unregistered voters and 2) registers 10 percent of currently 
unregistered voters.” 
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• Combatting Childhood Obesity: “Which of these policies do 
you prefer, as part of a program to combat childhood obesity? 
Assume that 1) is far more effective. On average, it cuts caloric 
consumption by 30 percent, whereas 2) cuts caloric 
consumption by just 5 percent.” 
• Discouraging Abortions: “Which of these policies do you 
prefer, as a means of discouraging abortions? Assume that 1) is 
significantly more effective. It cuts the abortion rate by 30 
percent, whereas 2) cuts the abortion rate by 5 percent. (Please 
indicate which you prefer even if you do not like either.)” 
B. General Results for the Preference as Between the System 1 and 
System 2 Nudge in the Context of Three Distinctive Issues 
 The right to vote has a special resonance, and any effort to nudge 
people to exercise that right is likely to attract significant support. The 
right to choose abortion has a similar resonance, even if it is far more 
controversial; an effort to nudge people to choose abortion, or not to 
choose it, will raise questions that are unique to that context. The 
question of childhood obesity is distinctive for a different reason: it 
involves children, where System 1 nudges might be more acceptable. 
(Parents appeal to System 1 all the time.66) We might expect that 
majorities would be especially sympathetic to System 1 nudges to 
encourage voting; especially unsympathetic to System 1 nudges to 
discourage abortion; and especially sympathetic to System 1 nudges to 




 66. I am confident that this proposition is true, but I might be somewhat unusual in actually 
explaining System 1 and System 2 to my son, five years old at the time. He has a keen interest in 
toys, and in my buying him more of them, even though he already has plenty. One day I explained 
to him that though his System 1 wants more toys, his System 2 knows that he does not need them. 
He understood the distinction immediately (though for a month or so he referred to his “Part 1” 
and “Part 2”). After struggling with his emotions whenever we passed toy stores, he finally asked, 
“Daddy, do I even have a System 2?” 
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2016  3:18 PM 
2016] PEOPLE PREFER SYSTEM 2 NUDGES 147 
1. Increasing Voter Registration.  Most Americans prefer 
automatic voter registration to efforts to encourage people to register. 
The changes in assumptions do not produce statistically significant 
changes in levels of support: 
Table 9: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the Nudge Aims to Increase Voter Registration 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Condition Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
1)  Neutral 57% 43% 
2)  System 1 Nudge “Significantly 
More Effective” 
62% 38% 
3)  System 1 Nudge “Significantly 
More Effective,” with Quantitative 
Information 
61% 39% 




There are two noteworthy findings here. The first is that a majority 
prefers the System 1 nudge in all four conditions. The reason is 
probably a strong (moral) judgment or intuition that people should be 
voters by default; they should not have to take steps to attain that 
status. The second is that with respect to automatic voter registration, 
movements do not occur across the three conditions, as they sometimes 
do for the four nudges previously discussed.67 
2. Combatting Childhood Obesity.  For childhood obesity, a small 
majority favors cafeteria design over parental education, except when 




 67. In particular, we observe movements from Condition 1 to Conditions 2 and 3 for the four 
standard nudges discussed in Part II; no such movements are found here. 
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Table 10: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge to 
Combat Childhood Obesity 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Condition Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
1)  Neutral 53% 47% 
2)  System 1 Nudge “Significantly 
More Effective” 
53% 47% 
3)  System 1 Nudge “Significantly 
More Effective,” with Quantitative 
Information 
63% 37% 




In the three “informed” conditions, only one shift is significant: 
with quantitative information, there is an increase in support for 
cafeteria design. In general, we do not find the same kinds of shifts as 
are observed for the four more standard nudges. 
3. Discouraging Abortions.  For abortion, the System 2 nudge is 
preferred by a substantial majority. (Note that for this question, 
participants were specifically asked to choose one option even if they 
did not like either, acknowledging that on that highly sensitive issue, 
some respondents might reject both nudges.) The preference for the 
System 2 nudge does not shift significantly across the four conditions: 
Table 11: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the Nudge Aims to Discourage Abortions 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Condition Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
1)  Neutral 25% 75% 
2)  System 1 Nudge “Significantly 
More Effective” 
34% 66% 
3)  System 1 Nudge “Significantly 
More Effective,” with Quantitative 
Information 
33% 67% 
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The best explanation here is probably that, for an intensely 
personal decision of this kind, most people do not want the government 
to attempt to move people by engaging or exploiting System 1. If so, 
movements across the conditions should not be expected. For many 
people, of course, abortion is a morally questionable or unacceptable 
choice, and for them, a System 1 nudge might seem better, either 
because it is more likely to be effective or because it is a more pointed 
and direct response to those who are considering that choice. Hence 
the steady minority support for the System 1 nudge is also unsurprising. 
C. Respondent Preferences by Partisan Affiliation 
What is the role of political divisions? We might well expect that 
it would be larger than in the four standard cases, and in some respects 
it is, but the full story is not entirely straightforward. Here are the 
results: 
Table 12: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the Nudge Aims to 
Increase Voter Registration 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Condition 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
1)  Neutral 65% 53% 52% 35% 47% 43% 
2)  System 1 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective” 
63% 53% 57% 37% 47% 43% 
3)  System 1 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective,” 
with Quantitative Information 
71% 54% 58% 29% 46% 42% 
4)  System 2 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective” 
55% 53% 48% 45% 47% 52% 
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Table 13: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the Nudge Aims to 
Combat Childhood Obesity 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Condition 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
1)  Neutral 61% 45% 51% 39% 54% 49% 
2)  System 1 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective” 
59% 48% 52% 41% 52% 48% 
3)  System 1 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective,” 
with Quantitative Information 
70% 52% 67% 30% 48% 33% 
4)  System 2 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective” 
51% 43% 49% 49% 57% 51% 
 
Table 14: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the Nudge Aims to 
Discourage Abortions 
 Percentage of Respondents Who: 
Condition 
Prefer System 1 Nudge Prefer System 2 Nudge 
Dem. Rep. Indep. Dem. Rep. Indep. 
1)  Neutral 20% 32% 23% 80% 68% 77% 
2)  System 1 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective” 
30% 42% 29% 70% 58% 71% 
3)  System 1 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective,” 
with Quantitative Information 
25% 43% 31% 75% 57% 69% 
4)  System 2 Nudge 
“Significantly More Effective” 
24% 34% 30% 76% 66% 70% 
 
The most consistent difference can be found in the area of 
discouraging abortions, where higher percentages of Republicans are 
more inclined to favor the System 1 nudge across all four conditions. 
In three of the four conditions, the difference for that question is 
statistically significant between Democrats and Republicans (the 
exception is when respondents are told the System 2 nudge is 
significantly more effective).68 For both increasing voter registration 
and combatting childhood obesity, the difference between Democrats 
 
 68. Using chi-square analysis, two-tailed p < 0.05 for each question. 
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and Republicans for the neutral condition is significant, and when they 
have been informed that there is a quantitative advantage to a System 
1 nudge, Democrats and independents show a significant difference for 
voting. Republicans and independents show such a difference in 
relation to abortion when told that System 1 nudges are significantly 
more effective, both with and without actual numbers. Republicans 
and independents show such a difference in relation to childhood 
obesity when told that System 1 nudges are more effective with 
numbers. Interestingly, there is no significant difference of any kind 
when respondents are told that System 2 nudges are more effective. 
Here as well, the details should not obscure the basic story: when 
issues are politically contested, there is more likely to be a partisan 
difference in terms of choice between System 1 and System 2 nudges. 
Apparently it is the case that if people strongly support a particular 
end, they will be more likely to support a System 1 nudge to attain it.69 
I speculate that when the end seems especially important, the 
overriding consideration is how best to achieve that end, and people 
will favor the nudge that seems most likely to do that. Another 
consideration, perhaps explaining some of the results here, is that when 
people have an intense emotional reaction to some outcome (such as 
the use of illegal drugs), they might well favor a System 1 response 
(such as a graphic warning). 
For the four standard cases in Part II, on the other hand, political 
affiliation usually did not explain people’s choices between System 1 
and System 2 nudges (with interesting exceptions, especially in the case 
of reducing pollution). By contrast, political affiliation mattered much 
more for abortion, voting, and childhood obesity. It would not, of 
course, be surprising to find that Democrats are less supportive of pro-
life nudges than Republicans, or that Republicans are less enthusiastic 
than Democrats about automatic voter registration or efforts to 
combat childhood obesity.70 
IV.  DIGGING DEEPER INTO THE FINDINGS: FOLLOW-UP STUDIES 
The nationally representative survey offers a great deal of 
information about what people think, but it also leaves many mysteries. 
Why, for example, did the neutral condition produce essentially the 
 
 69. If so, are people motivated by System 1 or by System 2? I believe that System 1 is the 
right answer, but the current survey cannot prove the point. 
 70. See Sunstein, supra note 62, (manuscript at 10 tbl.2, 12 tbl.4, 19) (finding evidence to this 
effect). 
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same results as the “System 2 nudge is significantly more effective” 
condition? Why did the “System 1 nudge is significantly more 
effective” condition produce the same results as the condition in which 
that advantage was displayed with impressive numbers? And why, 
exactly, do some people favor System 1 nudges, and others favor 
System 2 nudges? 
To answer these questions, I conducted four follow-up studies, all 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The populations are not nationally 
representative, and for that reason, the results must be taken with a 
grain of salt.71 At the same time, the numbers in the neutral condition 
are closely in line with the nationally representative survey. It is not 
unreasonable to think that, in terms of the particular questions I am 
exploring here, the results would hold up with a nationally 
representative sample. 
A. Testing Preferences with a Within-Subjects Design 
The surveys discussed in Parts II and III involved a “between-
subjects” design. Different groups of participants saw different 
conditions, rather than all of them at once. That design has significant 
advantages, because it prevents contamination by previous answers. If 
questions are seen in isolation, responses cannot be affected by order 
effects, or by a particular factor that becomes highlighted only by virtue 
of its clear difference from a previous question. In a sense, the answers 
in a between-subjects design are pure, because a factor (say, 
comparative effectiveness) will not assume more salience than it would 
if people were looking at the conditions at the same time. 
Nonetheless, there are also advantages to a “within-subjects” 
design, by which participants see, and answer, all of the questions in 
the same survey. For present purposes, the principal advantage is that 
with a within-subjects design, it is possible to test whether people’s 
original answers shift after they are given information about 
comparative effectiveness. That question is important to test, because it 
reveals whether some people are strongly committed to System 1 or 
 
 71. For some relevant characteristics of participants in Amazon Mechanical Turk studies, 
see supra note 41. The advantage of nationally representative surveys is, of course, that they 
involve a roughly accurate snapshot of the relevant public (in this case, the United States). By 
contrast, participants in online surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk are self-selected; they 
choose to participate, and their judgments, interests, and values might be quite different from a 
nationally representative group. In the surveys presented here, however, there are only modest 
differences between participants in the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey and participants in the 
nationally representative survey when the same questions were asked. 
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System 2 nudges—so committed that they will stick with one or the 
other even when effectiveness information stares them in the face. 
With a within-subjects design, we can also cast light on two questions 
raised by the between-subjects survey: (1) Does quantitative 
information really make no difference to people? (2) Are people really 
indifferent to whether System 2 nudges are significantly more 
effective? 
I used Amazon Mechanical Turk to ask about four hundred 
people twenty-four questions, involving all of the areas tested above 
(with the exception of abortion72). Here are the results: 
Table 15: Within-Subjects Results for the Preference as Between the 
System 1 and System 2 Nudge for Six of the Seven Issues Across the 
Four Conditions 
 Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer the System 1 Nudge  
Issue 1 2 3 4 
Smoking 41% 57% 67% 30% 
Savings 45% 58% 72% 28% 
Energy 36% 50% 69% 19% 
Water 42% 55% 67% 21% 
Obesity 61% 71% 78% 29% 
Voting 60% 66% 76% 34% 
 
Several things are relatively clear. The most important is that the 
pattern of responses is quite orderly. We see the general movements 
that we should expect. Comparative effectiveness information in favor 
of System 1 nudges increases support for System 1 nudges, quantitative 
information increases support still further, and comparative 
effectiveness information in favor of System 2 nudges increases support 
for System 2 nudges. In the two latter respects, we observe movements 
 
 72. This area was excluded on the ground that it is highly controversial, and it is not clear 
how much more would be learned in a within-subjects design. From the nationally representative 
survey, we know that most people will oppose System 1 nudges to discourage abortion even in a 
between-subjects design, and that the numbers do not move much across conditions. Because 
people’s judgments about such nudges are likely to depend on their views about abortion (and 
hence effectiveness information showing that System 1 nudges do in fact discourage abortion does 
not move them), we do not expect major shifts in a within-subjects design. Admittedly, that 
hypothesis remains to be tested. 
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that make sense, and that are not found in the between-subjects 
design.73 
To offer a bit more detail: in general, the answers in the neutral 
condition are fairly close to what was found in the nationally 
representative sample. At the same time, and as anticipated, some of 
the movements across conditions are greater. From the neutral 
condition to the “System 1 nudge is significantly more effective” 
condition, the movements are in line with those in the nationally 
representative sample. But in the between-subjects design, the 
quantitative information makes a real difference. And for all questions, 
movements of at least 11 percent, and sometimes of more than 20 
percent, can be found from the neutral condition to the “System 2 
nudge is significantly more effective” condition. In this survey, then, 
the differences among the conditions produced reliable shifts in 
people’s views. 
There are two important qualifications. First, at least one-third of 
the population continued to favor the System 2 nudge in the within-
subjects condition, even when they were given numbers to support the 
comparatively greater effectiveness of the System 1 nudge. That result 
might be taken as surprising. Second, large percentages of people 
(usually around one-quarter) continued to favor the System 1 nudge in 
the within-subjects condition, even when they were informed that the 
System 2 nudge was significantly more effective. That result also seems 
surprising. 
Although it does not involve a nationally representative sample, 
the within-subjects study provides useful information. It suggests that 
with information about greater comparative effectiveness, the number 
of people who shift to System 1 nudges will probably be greater in a 
within-subjects design—and that the appeal of the System 2 nudge will 
also be heightened, in that design, with evidence of greater 
effectiveness. At the same time, the within-subjects design fortifies the 
general conclusion that a certain percentage of the population will 
favor System 2 nudges even if they are significantly less effective, in 
large part because of a commitment to a certain conception of 
individual agency. 
 
 73. One reason involves “evaluability”: in a within-subjects design with multiple questions, 
people can evaluate factors that might be hard to assess in the abstract. See Christopher Hsee, 
The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate 
Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 
255 (1996) (urging that when people are making decisions that involve joint presentations, they 
can evaluate factors that might defy evaluation when options are presented separately). 
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B. Testing Beliefs About Effectiveness, as Opposed to Preference 
Both the between-subjects and the within-subjects designs ask 
people to register their preferences. They do not test people’s 
independent judgments about effectiveness. Asking people about 
effectiveness should be illuminating: if people prefer System 2 nudges 
even though they think that System 1 nudges would be more effective, 
then we have good reason to think that a commitment to individual 
agency, or something like that, is driving their judgments. 
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, I asked about four hundred 
people the effectiveness question. The survey looked like this: 
 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as part of an antismoking 
campaign? 
1) Graphic warnings, with vivid pictures of 
people who are sick from cancer.  
2) Purely factual information, giving 
people statistical information about the 
risks from smoking 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as part of a campaign to 
encourage people to save for retirement? 
1) Automatic enrollment of employees in 
savings plans, subject to “opt out” if 
employees do not want to participate.  
2) Financial literacy programs at the 
workplace, so that employees are 
educated about retirement options. 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as part of a program to 
reduce pollution? 
1) Automatic enrollment of customers in 
slightly more expensive “green” 
(environmentally friendly) energy, subject 
to “opt out” if customers want another, 
slightly less expensive energy source. 
2) Educational campaigns so that 
consumers can learn the advantages of 
green (environmentally friendly) energy. 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective at promoting water 
conservation? 
1) The government requires hotels to 
select a default policy of “environment-
friendly rooms” in which towels left on the 
racks are not washed. If people want their 
towels washed, they can tell the front 
desk, and their towels will be washed 
daily. 
2) The government requires hotels to 
provide guests with information about an 
“environment-friendly” policy in which 
towels left on the racks are not washed. 
People are encouraged to choose to take 
part, but if they do not choose to do so, 
their towels will be washed every day. 
  
SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2016  3:18 PM 
156 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:121 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective in combatting childhood 
obesity? 
1) Redesigning school cafeterias so that 
healthy, low-calorie options are in the most 
visible locations. 
2) Educating parents about the problem of 
childhood obesity and how to combat it. 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective in increasing voter 
registration? 
1) Automatic voter registration, so that 
when people receive their driver’s licenses, 
and show they are domiciled in your state, 
they are automatically registered as voters. 
2) A public education campaign to 
convince people to register to vote. 
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as a means of discouraging 
abortions? (Please indicate which you prefer even if you do not like either.) 
1) Requiring pregnant women, before 
having an abortion, to see vivid photos of 
fetuses, designed to show that they are 
merely very young children. 
2) Requiring pregnant women, before 
having an abortion, to speak briefly with a 
doctor about whether they really believe, 
on reflection, that an abortion is the right 
choice, in light of the moral issues 
involved. 
  
 Here are the results: 
Table 16: Beliefs About Whether a System 1 or System 2 Nudge Is 
More Effective in the Context of Each of the Six Issues 
 Percentage of Respondents Who Believe: 
Issue System 1 Nudge Is More Effective System 2 Nudge Is More Effective 
Smoking 71% 29% 
Savings 53% 47% 
Energy 45% 55% 
Water 53% 47% 
Obesity 57% 43% 
Voting 75% 25% 
Abortion 30% 70% 
 
The most important finding is that majorities believe that the 
System 1 nudge is the more effective nudge for five of the seven 
questions—even though majorities prefer the System 1 nudge for only 
two (see Tables 1, 9, 10, and 11). We can plausibly infer that majorities 
will often prefer System 2 nudges even when they believe that System 
1 nudges are more effective—strongly suggesting that personal agency 
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drives some people in the direction of System 2 nudges. People’s beliefs 
about effectiveness also appear to be influenced by their values. The 
abortion problem is the clearest on that count; the overwhelming 
majority (70 percent) say that the System 2 nudge would be more 
effective even though that conclusion is far from self-evident. We might 
question whether in giving this response, they are really saying what 
they think is more “effective” in discouraging abortion. It is far more 
likely that they are registering what they prefer, given their values. 
To be sure, the population that answered the effectiveness 
question was not nationally representative, and we do not know 
whether an effectiveness–preference split would be observed in a 
nationally representative survey, with either a within-subjects or a 
between-subjects design. Nonetheless, we have seen that in the neutral 
condition and the “significantly more effective condition,” the results 
on the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey reported here are very much 
in line with the results in the nationally representative sample. The 
effectiveness answers strongly suggest that a certain percentage of 
people will favor System 2 nudges even though they believe them to be 
less effective. 
C. Comparing the Assumptions that the System 1 Nudge Is 
“Significantly More Effective” or “Dramatically More Effective” 
In the main survey, the difference between Condition 1 on the one 
hand and Conditions 2 and 3 on the other was large, but not massive. 
For this reason, it is worth asking whether more people would prefer 
the System 1 nudge if the numbers showing its greater effectiveness 
were more dramatic. To test that question, I used the four standard 
questions in a within-subjects design, but offered exceptionally vivid 
accounts of the differential effectiveness: 
 
• Antismoking Campaign: “Assume that 1) would be significantly 
more effective than 2), in the sense that it would prevent 15,000 
premature deaths each year, whereas 2) would prevent only 500. 
Which of the two would you prefer, with that assumption?” 
• Encouraging Retirement Savings: “Assume that 1) would be 
significantly more effective than 2), in the sense that it would 
mean that 90 percent of employees would be enrolled in savings 
plans, whereas 2) would mean that only 30 percent would be 
enrolled. Which of the two would you prefer, with that 
assumption?” 
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• Reducing Pollution: “Assume that 1) would be significantly 
more effective than 2), in the sense that it would cut air pollution 
by 50 percent (and prevent at least 2,000 annual deaths), 
whereas 2) would cut air pollution by just 5 percent (and prevent 
at least 200 annual deaths). Which of the two would you prefer, 
with that assumption?” 
• Encouraging Water Conservation: “Assume that 1) would be 
significantly more effective than 2), in the sense that it would cut 
water usage at hotels by 10 percent, whereas 2) would cut such 
usage by just 1 percent. Which of the two would you prefer, with 
that assumption?” 
 
With these formulations, the increase in preference for the System 
1 nudge from Condition 1 to Condition 3 was indeed large: 
Table 17: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the System 1 Nudge Is Dramatically More Effective 




Given Quantitative Information 
Showing that System 1 Nudge Is 
Dramatically More Effective 
Smoking 42% 76% 
Savings 42% 67% 
Energy 35% 70% 
Water 42% 64% 
 
There are two lessons, and both of them are surprising. The first 
is that the dramatic numbers in this survey produced movements (from 
a low of 22 percent to a high of 34 percent) that were not higher than 
those produced by less dramatic numbers (see Table 15). Apparently 
many people make a judgment about something relatively crude 
(“whether a big difference matters”) and they decide to move, or not 
to move, accordingly. We might speculate that the difference between 
significantly greater effectiveness and dramatically greater 
effectiveness would be larger in a within-subjects design. 
The second lesson is that, even with relatively stunning differences 
in effectiveness, a substantial number of people continued to prefer the 
System 2 nudge. This was the case for 24 percent of respondents who 
rejected the graphic cigarette warnings at the expense of 14,500 lives, 
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and for the 30 percent of respondents who rejected the automatic 
enrollment in green energy programs at the expense of 1,800 lives. 
shown to be significantly more  What if the System 2 nudge were
effective, not in the abstract, but with the benefit of numbers? To 
answer that question, I did a version of the immediately preceding 
survey with the identical numbers, except for one difference: System 2 
was said to be the more effective one. The results, with four hundred 
participants, looked like this: 
Table 18: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge 
When the System 2 Nudge Is Dramatically More Effective 




Told System 2 Nudge Is 
Dramatically More Effective 
Smoking 41% 19% 
Savings 44% 19% 
Energy 34% 14% 
Water 45% 17% 
 
As should be expected, the assumption of quantitative data 
showing dramatically greater effectiveness of System 2 nudges had a 
substantial effect in this within-subjects survey. The shifts ranged from 
20 percent to 28 percent. This was a large shift, and the increase in those 
preferring System 2 across the four categories was nearly lock-step. At 
the same time, a significant fraction of people (somewhat less than one-
fifth) continued to favor the System 1 nudge. It remains unclear why 
they did so. Perhaps they refused to accept the effectiveness numbers. 
Perhaps they believed that System 1 nudges have independent 
advantages.  
D. Testing Preferences with an “Either or Both” Option 
The topic here has been a required choice among two options: 
System 1 nudge or System 2 nudge? In many cases, however, it is 
possible to choose neither, or both. Earlier work has tested the 
and question, and found that strong majorities of Americans  ”neither“
Europeans reject that approach; they like the relevant nudges.74 
Earlier work has also found that if asked to approve or disapprove 
 
 74. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 7; Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Europeans 
Like Nudges?, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 310, 311 (2016). 
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System 1 nudges of the kind that have been tested here, strong 
e System majorities approve. But what if people were asked to choos
 ?both1, System 2, or  
Again using Amazon Mechanical Turk, I asked about four 
hundred people that question. Here are the results:  
Table 19: Either or Both? 
 Percentage of Respondents Who Preferred: 
Issue System 1 Nudge System 2 Nudge Both 
Smoking 10% 44% 46% 
Savings 16% 40% 44% 
Energy 10% 56% 34% 
 
The most obvious lesson is that numerous people will support 
both, even though they will favor one or the other when they are 
 ”both“forced to choose between them. For both smoking and savings, 
for air  did not fall that far short of obtaining majority support, and
third of respondents. At the same time, -pollution, it attracted over one
probably on the  ”both,“many people favored a System 2 nudge over 
theory that the System 1 nudge is insufficiently respectful of individual 
the System 2 nudge. This is a  agency, or that it adds nothing to
noteworthy result; other works suggest that if people are asked 
whether they support a System 1 or System 2 nudge in isolation 
(smoking, savings, air pollution), they might well say yes. 75 
Further study would be quite valuable in order to illuminate these 
results. We might speculate that the likelihood that people will prefer 
“both” depends in part on their perception of the magnitude of the 
problem. If it is very serious, people might think: the more tools, the 
better. The question is whether the interest in individual agency, as it 
is perceived by those who favor System 2 nudges, outweighs that 
thought. 
V.  POPULAR OPINION, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Survey evidence can tell us a great deal about what kinds of 
policies will produce public approval or disapproval. We know that 
both Americans and Europeans are broadly supportive of the kinds of 
nudges that have been implemented or under serious discussion in 
 
 75. See Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 319; Sunstein, supra note 62 (manuscript at 9). 
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recent years, and that this support generally cuts across partisan lines.76 
We know too that when people are not asked to choose between 
System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges, and are simply asked whether 
they approve of a nudge, they tend to say yes. This includes, for 
example, graphic warnings designed to reduce smoking and distracted 
driving, and automatic enrollment in savings plans and green energy.77 
We also know that Americans reject nudges that reflect what they see 
as illicit ends (such as religious favoritism) or those that are 
inconsistent with the values and interests of most choosers (such as 
automatic contributions to particular charities).78 There is a concern 
about manipulation, at least in extreme cases, such as the use of 
subliminal advertising to discourage smoking79 or visual illusions to 
encourage drivers to slow down.80 
At the same time, the results of surveys may or may not track what 
would emerge from a sustained analysis of the normative questions, 
especially if the analysis is infused with an understanding of likely 
consequences.81 In fact, we do not know exactly what people are 
thinking when they respond to survey questions. 
Consider an admittedly speculative hypothesis: System 1 prefers 
System 2 nudges. That is, people might well have a rapid, intuitive 
judgment that System 2 nudges are best. On this view, the automatic 
system favors System 2 nudges, and the deliberative system is necessary 
to override that form of favoritism. The reason might be that System 2 
nudges seem the most respectful of individual agency. People might 
automatically think that it is best not to use a default rule or to frighten 
people, but instead to inform them, so that they can choose for 
themselves. But System 2 might be more consequentialist, and so it 
might not accept that automatic conclusion; it might ask about the 
actual effects of one or another nudge, and not place such an overriding 
emphasis on individual agency.82 
 
 76. Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 68. 
 77. On the United States, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 121–22. For European evidence, 
with broadly similar results, see generally Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 74. 
 78. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 129–34. 
 79. Id. at 132. 
 80. See Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 66. 
 81. For a sustained argument in favor of “boosts,” see generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 
supra note 24. Boosts can be seen as a subset of System 2 nudges. Riccardo Rebonato identifies 
nudges with System 1 and objects to them on both welfarist and nonwelfarist grounds. 
REBONATO, supra note 27, at 6. 
 82. Cf. Joshua D. Greene, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science 
Matters for Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695, 700–01 (2014) (outlining evidence of automatic, System 1 
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The data here are not sufficient to support the hypothesis that 
System 1 favors System 2 nudges (although I believe that it is true, at 
least for many respondents); the majority’s preference for System 2 
nudges may in fact be deliberative, rather than automatic. But the 
hypothesis that people make an automatic judgment in favor of System 
2 nudges cannot be ruled out of bounds. It could easily be tested—for 
example, by asking people to answer survey questions under time 
pressure or after some kind of “cognitive load” (for example, a difficult 
math question, which would deplete analytical resources). It would be 
worthwhile to engage in such tests, to see whether many or most people 
do in fact show an immediate preference for System 2 nudges (as I 
suspect). 
Consider another hypothesis: System 2 favors System 1 nudges. 
The basic idea is that System 2 will make all-things-considered 
judgments, with careful reference to consequences. Once reflection 
and deliberation are involved, people will often understand that 
System 1 nudges are both more effective and less costly, even if they 
lack intuitive appeal.83 The data here are also insufficient to support 
that hypothesis, though it is imaginable that a careful analysis of 
various situations would suggest that System 1 nudges often or 
generally work better.84 And as stated, the hypothesis is far too broad: 
in some circumstances, System 2 nudges will be better on normative 
grounds, and System 2 will acknowledge that fact.85 
How should regulators think about the choice between the two 
kinds of nudges, having as they do a toolbox of instruments? It is 
possible, of course, that mandates will be better than nudges of any 
kind; perhaps they will be more effective and have higher net benefits.86 
 
preference for deontological approaches, while contending that System 2 favors utilitarian 
approaches). 
 83. See Willis, supra note 37, at 431–32 (questioning the usefulness of financial education and 
arguing that helpful default rules are often better). Of course it is true that education can be 
helpful, and so System 2 might decide in its favor. See Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24, 
at 5 (arguing for boosting people’s capacities). 
 84. See Bubb, supra note 29, at 1027–28 (arguing that System 1 nudges might well work better 
than System 2 nudges); Willis, supra note 37, at 431–32 (raising doubts about financial education 
and arguing for sensible default rules). 
 85. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (arguing for what they call boosts 
as opposed to what they call nudges). 
 86. For a provocative discussion, see generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY 
(2014) (arguing for coercive paternalism and rejecting autonomy-based objections). In the same 
vein, see Ryan Bubb & Richard Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1599 (2014) (defending mandates rather than nudges, with reference to 
behavioral findings). 
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It is also possible that inaction is best, because any new intervention 
could have costs in excess of benefits.87 Economic incentives might be 
the best approach of all.88 But in many contexts, policymakers must 
specifically decide between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges.89 To 
promote savings, they might engage in an educational campaign or opt 
for automatic enrollment;90 to promote access to public programs, they 
might rely on education or new default rules; to discourage smoking or 
distracted driving, they might rely on graphic warnings or a statistical 
presentation of some kind. How should policymakers decide? 
To come to terms with that question, it would be helpful to specify 
the foundations for the answer. Suppose that we are welfarists, 
believing that any evaluation has to turn on the effects of an 
intervention on social welfare.91 If so, helpful questions are: What are 
the costs and benefits of a System 1 or System 2 nudge?92 Which has 
higher net benefits? For these questions, information about 
effectiveness is relevant, but it is hardly sufficient on its own. We need 
cost information as well. A maximally effective nudge might be too 
costly to be worthwhile, or it might have lower net benefits than a 
somewhat less effective but far less costly nudge. 
In addition, the effectiveness information does not, by itself, give 
a full account of the benefits of a nudge. If 90 percent of people end up 
in savings plans, or if automatic enrollment in green energy cuts 
pollution by 20 percent, what exactly are the welfare consequences? 
Increases in participation rates and reductions in pollution seem 
desirable, but a great deal of further work would be necessary to 
understand exactly how desirable they are. Are increases in 
participation rates important? How important? What are the mortality 
and morbidity consequences of cutting pollution levels by 20 percent? 
In these respects, the survey questions, even in the various conditions, 
 
 87. See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 143–44, 148 
(2006). 
 88. For a crisp discussion of the circumstances in which this is so, see STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 48–49 (1981). 
 89. The First Amendment might turn out to be relevant insofar as government is compelling 
private speech. See Jolls, supra note 28, at 54. 
 90. See Willis, supra note 37, at 431. 
 91. A welfarist approach is used in Bubb & Pildes, supra note 86, at 1599, 1601 (suggesting 
that on welfare grounds, mandates are often preferable to nudges). 
 92. There might of course be a disjunction between welfare effects and what emerges from 
a cost-benefit analysis. I am bracketing that possibility here. For a discussion of the philosophical 
foundations of cost-benefit analysis, see generally MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR 
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012). 
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failed to provide respondents with full information. But it is 
noteworthy that as we have seen, even dramatically greater 
effectiveness from System 1 nudges failed to move a large group of 
people in its favor. 
At first glance, welfarists would have no systematic reason to 
prefer System 1 nudges to System 2 nudges, or vice versa. Everything 
turns on the costs and benefits.93 But second-order considerations 
might cut in one direction or another. Part of the welfare calculation 
involves the cost of nudging itself. Under imaginable conditions, 
System 1 nudges can be far simpler to implement (as, for example, 
when they involve a mere default rule).94 At the same time, it is 
relevant to ask about the long-term effects of a nudge.95 If a System 2 
nudge would educate people and have beneficial effects in multiple 
domains of their lives, then it would have ancillary benefits, and these 
might turn out to be significant.96 (Consider financial education, which 
could benefit people when they are making many economic decisions, 
and which could, in principle, teach people statistical literacy as well.97) 
It is doubtful that survey responses, offered without extended 
contemplation, are adequately capturing these points, though some 
respondents might be attentive to them. 
Suppose that we are not welfarists and that we believe that for 
reasons that involve dignity or autonomy, people ought to be active 
agents, affirmatively responsible for outcomes that affect their lives.98 
To be sure, this idea has considerable ambiguity, but something of this 
sort undergirds the judgment that even if automatic enrollment of 
some kind can promote people’s welfare, it is more respectful to them, 
and therefore best, for them to become informed and then to choose.99 
 
 93. If a System 1 nudge causes a welfare loss because people resent it, that loss would of 
course have to be included. Cf. CONLY, supra note 86, at 155–59 (cataloguing the welfare effects 
of soda regulation). 
 94. See Willis, supra note 37, at 432 (using a welfarist framework to challenge financial 
literacy training). 
 95. For relevant discussion, see Hunt Alcott & Todd Rogers, The Short-Run and Long-Run 
Effects of Behavioral Interventions 18–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
18492, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18492 [https://perma.cc/9AAZ-6ZNB] (showing that 
information about social norms has only short-term effects unless the information is provided for 
a significant period of time, in which case it can have significant long-term effects). 
 96. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (defending “boosts”). 
 97. See GERD GIGERENZER, RISK SAVVY: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DECISIONS 246 (2015) 
(arguing for risk-related education). 
 98. See generally REBONATO, supra note 27 (arguing broadly on behalf of active choosing). 
 99. Cf. Nicolas Cornell, A Third Theory of Paternalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1308 n.43, 
1336 (2015) (arguing that paternalism shows such disrespect). 
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Perhaps what is wrong with paternalism, even of the choice-preserving 
kind, is that it is insulting to people’s capacity for agency; perhaps it 
shows a form of disrespect.100 Why not educate people, rather than 
enrolling them in a program that the government thinks is in their 
interest? 
Different people who press this question might accept diverse 
kinds of answers. Some people might agree that if automatic 
enrollment is significantly better on welfare grounds,101 it is not 
necessary or preferable to educate people; but they would insist that 
the government must meet the burden of demonstrating that it is 
significantly better. Other people might adopt a strong presumption in 
favor of educative approaches and demand an exceptionally strong 
demonstration of higher net benefits. Still others might believe that, in 
at least some contexts, no such demonstration could justify a System 1 
nudge. A continuum of beliefs might well be imagined. Such a 
continuum would, of course, fit with the results here. 
CONCLUSION 
In some circles, there is a strong preference for interventions that 
augment people’s capacities,102 and skepticism about forms of choice 
architecture that seem to exploit or take advantage of people’s 
fallibility.103 If a default rule works because of inertia, for example, it 
might be seen to be a form of manipulation,104 and even if that charge 
is far too strong,105 some people might contend that it is best to rely on 
education.106 On one view, the choice between System 1 and System 2 
 
 100. Id. A powerful response arguing that it is not disrespectful for government to act on the 
basis of an accurate understanding of people’s capacities can be found in CONLY, supra note 86, 
at 36, 45. 
 101. Willis, supra note 37, at 431–32 (urging that automatic enrollment is desirable and 
preferable to financial education). 
 102. See REBONATO, supra note 27, at 105 (arguing against nudges). 
 103. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (arguing for boosts rather than 
nudges). For relevant discussion from another direction, see generally CONLY, supra note 86 
(defending coercive paternalism); Moles, supra note 34, at 2–4 (defending nudges against various 
objections). 
 104. On that topic, see Anne Barnhill, What Is Manipulation?, in MANIPULATION: THEORY 
& PRACTICE 50, 71–72 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014) (defining manipulation by 
reference to ideals for beliefs and emotions). Barnhill builds on Robert Noggle, Manipulative 
Actions: A Conceptual and Moral Analysis, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 43, 46 (1996) (offering a similar 
definition). 
 105. For an argument that characterizing a default rule that works because of inertia (as 
manipulation) is far too strong, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 33. 
 106. See Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24, at 19. 
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nudges depends on an assessment of comparative welfare effects, 
which requires a form of cost-benefit analysis. On another view, 
concerns about autonomy and dignity deserve a central place.107 
My primary goal in this Article has been to investigate what 
people actually think about these questions. The central finding is that 
most people usually do prefer System 2 nudges, at least in the class of 
cases that were tested. Moreover, this preference cuts across partisan 
lines. When participants were told to assume that System 1 nudges 
were significantly more effective, they were more likely to prefer 
System 1 nudges—usually producing a shift toward such nudges of 
between 10 percent and 14 percent.108 When participants were given 
quantitative information showing that System 1 was significantly more 
effective, the shift was essentially identical (at least in a between-
subjects design).109 And when people were asked to assume that System 
2 nudges were significantly more effective, their judgments were about 
the same as in the neutral condition—a most unexpected finding.110 
Differences across partisan affiliations were not pervasive, but 
they did emerge in several contexts. For example, Democrats are more 
inclined to favor System 1 nudges in the contexts of green energy and 
water conservation.111 But the more dramatic finding is that in general, 
Democrats, Republicans, and independents show strikingly similar 
patterns of responses. They tend to favor System 2 nudges, at least in 
the standard cases, to shift by the same percentages both when they are 
asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more effective 
and when they are given quantitative information to demonstrate that 
it is more effective, and to show the same results in the neutral 
condition and when they are asked to assume that the System 2 nudge 
is significantly more effective.112 
Follow-up studies show that in a within-subjects design, some of 
these findings are reversed.113 With that design, quantitative 
information that specifies the greater effectiveness of System 1 nudges 
does make a difference. With that design, a statement that System 2 
nudges are “significantly more effective” increases support for System 
 
 107. See Waldron, supra note 35 (emphasizing the importance of dignity). 
 108. See supra Table 2. 
 109. See supra Table 3. 
 110. See supra Table 4. 
 111. See supra Table 5. 
 112. See supra Tables 6, 7, 8. 
 113. See supra Table 15. 
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2 nudges. A majority of respondents believes that System 1 nudges are 
likely to be more effective even when a majority prefers System 2 
nudges—a strong clue that some people like those nudges for reasons 
that have nothing to do with effectiveness. Offered the opportunity to 
choose both System 1 and System 2 nudges, a large number of people 
do exactly that. 
It is important to emphasize how much remains to be learned. As 
we have seen, different subject areas elicit different responses. If 
people care greatly about the end, perhaps effectiveness is all that 
matters,114 and the issue of agency will seem beside the point. For 
example, a System 1 nudge to reduce criminal violence might be 
preferred purely on effectiveness grounds, and people will not much 
care that a System 2 nudge preserves people’s capacity to exercise their 
own agency (to murder or to rape). We can easily go further: if people 
are outraged by the conduct that is being targeted (murder, rape), and 
if they want to eliminate it, a mandate will be entirely acceptable, and 
a System 1 nudge, complementing that mandate, will be 
unobjectionable in principle. 
To the extent that the issue is polarizing on political grounds, we 
might also expect to see polarized judgments about which kind of 
nudge to favor. The abortion example is exemplary on this ground. We 
have seen that while most Democrats and Republicans favor System 2 
nudges to reduce abortions, the percentage of Republicans who favor 
System 1 nudges is significantly higher. For pollution reduction and 
water conservation, there is a similar difference, but in the opposite 
direction. If people question or do not like the ends of those who 
deploy nudges, they might end up preferring System 2 nudges, because 
they seem better on autonomy grounds. It should therefore be 
unsurprising that in some conditions, we also find partisan differences 
with respect to increasing voter registration and combatting childhood 
obesity. 
These findings have large implications for judgments about 
nudging in general. They suggest that we will find comparative 
receptivity to System 1 nudges when the ends seem desirable and when 
people trust the officials who seek to secure them—and comparative 
 
 114. A focus on net benefits would of course be better than a focus on effectiveness, because 
welfare is what matters, and net benefits are a measure of welfare. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges 
That Fail 20 (July 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2809658 [https://perma.cc/CN97-CUUS] (“What matters is welfare, not 
effectiveness.”). 
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skepticism about System 1 nudges when the ends seem questionable or 
the officials untrustworthy.115 
The most interesting question involves the precise tradeoff 
between sacrificing a degree of personal agency (as System 1 nudges 
might be taken to do) and increasing effectiveness. People put different 
weight on agency, and understand it in different ways,116 and some will 
demand a steep price, in terms of effectiveness, to compromise it. Here 
as well, context matters, and so the value placed on agency will be high 
for some populations (with respect to, say, the right to choose 
abortion), whereas it will be low for those very populations (with 
respect to, say, voter registration). The value of agency varies across 
persons and contexts. 
Although some people greatly like to exercise agency, and want 
to retain it,117 other people do not; they choose not to choose.118 On this 
count, context matters greatly. For some of the subjects of nudging, the 
exercise of agency is a cost rather than a benefit; voter registration is 
the most prominent case in point. A form of choice architecture that 
simply respects rights, and does not require people to take action to 
enjoy them, might be strongly favored on the ground that it makes 
things easy.119 The example suggests a larger point. System 1 might tend 
to prefer System 2 nudges, and System 2 might agree, but after 
sustained analysis, System 2 will often conclude that System 1 nudges 
are best. 
 
 115. Consider in this light the finding that as compared to people in other European nations, 
Hungarians are unusually skeptical about nudges. See Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 14. 
 116. Note that both System 1 and System 2 nudges retain freedom of choice and so might be 
seen to respect agency. For a discussion, see Moles, supra note 34, at 17 (discussing autonomy and 
nudging). 
 117. For relevant evidence, see Bobadilla-Suarez et al., supra note 44, at 8, 10–12 (finding that 
people will pay a premium to retain control, even when they know that delegation would be in 
their economic interest). 
 118. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 54 (discussing why the choice not to choose can be 
rational, and offering many examples of the phenomenon). 
 119. See THALER, supra note 3, at 237–38. 
